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This paper analyzes Thomas Bayes’ essay of 1763, together with the additions by Richard 
Price, in relation to (1) historical influences and (2) the Sayesianism of the 20th century. As 
regards (l), historical evidence is presented linking Price with Hume, and it is argued that 
Price’s additions are likely to have been written as an attempt to solve Hume’s problem of 
induction. As regards (2), it is shown that Bayes’ billiard table example is so constructed as 
to avoid the objections to Bayesianism made, in our own time, by R. A. Fisher and J. 
Neyman. Bayes did, however, introduce controversial Bayesian assumptions in his scho- 
lium, and was therefore a Bayesian-though a cautious Bayesian. Q 1987 Academic PKSS. IIIC. 
Dans cet article, l’auteur analyse le memoire de Bayes ecrit en 1763 ainsi que les comple- 
ments ajoutts par Richard Price. 11 analyse d’une part les influences historiques et d’autre 
part le bayesianisme au XXe siecle. En ce qui a trait au premier point, l’auteur met en 
evidence des liens entre Price et Hume et soutient que les complements de Price visaient 
probablement a resoudre le probleme d’induction souleve par Hume. En rapport avec 
le second point, l’auteur montre que l’exemple du billard choisi par Bayes fut construit 
de facon a Cviter les objections faites a Bpoque contre le bayesianisme par R. A. Fisher et 
J. Neyman. Toutefois, Bayes introduisit dans le Scholium des hypotheses bayesiennes 
discutables. 11 ttait done un bayesien, mais un bayesien prudent. Q 1987 Academic Press, 1~. 
In quest0 articolo l’autore considera il saggio di Thomas Bayes del 1763, insieme alle 
aggiunte di Richard Price, e Ii analizza in relazione (1) alle influenze storiche, e (2) al 
Bayesianismo de1 ventesimo secolo. Per quanto riguarda (1), l’evidenza storica mostra the 
esiste un legame the collega Price con Hume, e l’autore sostiene the le aggiunte di Price 
sono verosimilmente state scritte nel tentativo di risolvere il problema dell’induzione di 
Hume. Per quanto riguarda (2), si dimostra the I’esempio di Bayes de1 tavolo da biliardo e 
costruito in modo tale da non essere soggetto alle obiezioni al Bayesianismo fatte in tempi 
piu recenti da R. A. Fisher e J. Neyman. Nondimeno Bayes introdusse controversi postulati 
Bayesiani nel suo ed i? stato, quindi, un Bayesiano: un cauto Bayesiano. 0 1987 Academic press, 
Inc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE REV. THOMAS BAYES, AND BAYESIANISM 
IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
This paper [l] analyzes Bayes’ famous essay of 1763 in relation both to its own 
historical context and to the flourishing, but controversial, Bayesianism of the 
20th century. The author of the essay, Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) was a Presby- 
terian clergyman, who seems to have been reluctant to publish the essay which 
subsequently brought him fame. It was communicated to the Royal Society, after 
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his death, by his friend Richard Price (1723-1791)-another Presbyterian clergy- 
man. Price wrote an introductory letter and an appendix. As these are significant 
additions, the paper could with justice be considered a joint paper. Price’s gener- 
osity toward his dead friend has, to some extent, been responsible for the impor- 
tance of his own contribution being ignored. 
A study of the joint paper reveals a temperamental difference between its two 
authors. Bayes is the more rigorous and the more cautious. Price has wider 
philosophical interests and is prepared to be bolder (or should one say rasher?). 
These character differences must have made the two men ideal collaborators, and 
it is reasonable to suppose that they discussed the problems of the paper during 
Bayes’ lifetime. 
Is it significant that our two authors were both Presbyterian clergymen? During 
the 18th century in Britain, many not very religious intellectuals took holy orders 
to provide themselves with an income and the leisure needed to continue their 
studies. In this period, therefore, the fact that an author is a clergyman may not 
have an important bearing on his intellectual work. In the case of Bayes and Price, 
however, I shall argue that there is an important connection between their clerical 
status and their work in probability theory. Essentially their clerical status links 
them, as opponents, to Hume. 
In his introduction to a recent reprint of Bayes’ paper [Bayes & Price 17631, 
from which we will take our quotations, G. A. Barnard says: “the problem it 
[Bayes’ paper] discusses is still the subject of keen controversy” [Barnard 1970, 
1311. This is very true, and perhaps one could go further and say that the dispute 
between the Bayesians and the anti-Bayesians has been one of the major intellec- 
tual controversies of the 20th century. In this controversy both sides agree that a 
series of mathematical results, related to those proved by Bayes in his original 
paper, and which could be called Bayes’ Theorem (or perhaps Theorems) do 
follow rigorously from the generally accepted axioms of probability. The dispute 
concerns not Bayes’ Theorems themselves but a particular way of using them in 
scientific or statistical inference. This application of the theorems involves certain 
assumptions which can be, and have been, questioned. The application here men- 
tioned, that is, Bayesianism, can be defended either as a specific doctrine within 
statistics or as an account of scientific reasoning in general. Thus the whole issue 
is discussed both by statisticians and by philosophers of science. 
Bayesians of the 20th century include J. M. Keynes in his Treatise on Probabil- 
ity [1921], Harold Jeffreys in his Theory of Probability [1939], R. Carnap in his 
Logical Foundations of Probability [1950], and M. B. Hesse in her Structure of 
Scientz$c Inference [ 19741. The subjective approach to probability should also be 
referred to here, since subjectivists are always Bayesians. The subjective inter- 
pretation of probability was introduced in the 1920s and 1930s by F. P. Ramsey 
and B. De Finetti. It was subsequently developed by L. J. Savage and D. V. 
Lindley and is being further developed by such recent authors as A. P. Dawid, F. 
Lad, and A. F. M. Smith. 
De Finetti explains his attitude toward Bayes’ theorem very clearly in his 
Teoria delle Probabilitd [ 19701. (For a more extended discussion and criticism of 
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his views on this question, see [Gillies 1972, 152-1541.) De Finetti’s position is 
that “all that can be said regarding ‘inductive reasoning’ . . . , essentially, re- 
duces . . . to Bayes’ theorem” [De Finetti 1970, 5671. Having given a version of 
Bayes’ theorem, he states that: “ ‘Inductive reasoning’ is all here” [De Finetti 
1970,568], and this point is further emphasized on the next page where he writes, 
“A fact which needs stressing is that the explanation offered is unique, valid 
without distinction for all inductive reasoning” [De Finetti 1970, 5691. 
So, according to De Finetti, both science and everyday expectations are based 
on inductive reasoning, which, in turn, is explicated by means of Bayes’ theorem. 
This is the global Bayesian-inductivist position. 
The main critic of this position, among philoscphers of science, has of course 
been Popper. Far from supporting Bayesian (or probabilistic) inductivism, Popper 
holds that all forms of inductivism are incorrect and that there is really no such 
thing as inductive reasoning. In The Logic ofScienti$c Discovery. Popper wrote: 
My own view is that the various difficulties of inductive logic here sketched are insurmounta- 
ble. So also, I fear, are those inherent in the doctrine, so widely current today, that inductive 
inference although not “strictIy valid”, can attain some degree of “reliability” or of “proba- 
bility”. According to this doctrine, inductive inferences are “probable inferences”. [Popper 
1934, 291 
Popper has continued to criticize Bayesianism right down to the present, and, 
writing with Miller, produced a few years ago a new argument against the 
Bayesian position-the so-called Popper-Miller argument [Popper & Miller 19831 
PI. 
Bayesianism has, moreover, been criticized by statisticians as well as philoso- 
phers of science. R. A. Fisher was an opponent of Bayesianism, and a good 
account of his criticisms of the position is to be found in his Statistical Methods 
and Scientific Inference [1956, 8-171. In his early period up to 1930, Fisher held a 
falsificationist position [3]. However, in [Fisher 19301, he introduced the fiducial 
argument, which might be described as an inductivist, but non-Bayesian, ap- 
proach to statistics. It is significant that the statistical tests developed by Fisher in 
his early period are still widely used, while the fiducial argument has been gener- 
ally abandoned [4]. 
Another eminent statistician who has criticized Bayesianism is J. Neyman. In 
his papers previous to 1937, Neyman was perfectly prepared to introduce a priori 
probabilities and Bayesian methods. This continued to apply even after his inven- 
tion of the method of confidence intervals as his 1935 paper, “On the Problem of 
Confidence Intervals,” showed. But in his classic 1937 paper, “Outline of a 
Theory of Statistical Estimation Based on the Classical Theory of Probability,” 
there was a change of attitude and a definite rejection of Bayesianism. However, 
as we shall see, Neyman’s basic argument against Bayesianism was quite different 
from Fisher’s. Indeed Neyman’s argument told just as strongly against the fiducial 
argument as against Bayesianism. 
On the issue of inductivism, Neyman has a somewhat complicated position. He 
denies that there is such a thing as inductive reasoning, but claims, nonetheless, 
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that there is inductive behavior [Neyman 1952, 210, 2351. This position of Ney- 
man’s was sharply rejected by Fisher [1956, lOI-1021. 
Let us now consider how these 20th-century controversies relate to Bayes’ 
original paper of 1763. As far as I can tell, Bayes seems to have had no inkling of 
the kind of objection to Bayesianism embodied in the Popper-Miller argument. I 
shall argue, however, that the way in which he sets out his paper suggests that he 
was at least partially aware of the objections later made explicit by Fisher and 
Neyman. Despite this awareness, Bayes did adopt the Bayesian position, but he 
adopted it with a certain diffidence. So the answer to the question “Was Bayes a 
Bayesian?” is, I suggest, “Yes, he was a Bayesian, but a cautious and doubtful 
Bayesian. ” 
Before discussing these matters in detail, however, I want to consider another 
aspect of the problem. In the 20th century, discussions of Bayesianism have been 
closely connected with the problem of induction. Indeed many Bayesians have 
seen Bayesian inference as providing a kind of solution to the problem of induc- 
tion. Popper, on the other hand, has tried to develop a noninductivist solution to 
the problem of induction. This might well lead us to ask whether the founders of 
Bayesianism were concerned with the problem of induction. 
In the 18th century, the problem of induction was formulated by Hume. Hume’s 
first exposition of the question was published in his Treatise of Human Nature of 
1739-1740. This work, in Hume’s own words, “fell dead-born from the Press” 
[Hume 1776, 6121 [5]. Hume gave a shorter account of the matter in his Enquiry 
concerning the Human Understanding (originally entitled: Philosophical Essays 
concerning Human Understanding) of 1748, and he was more successful, on this 
second attempt, at getting his views known to the intellectual world. The joint 
paper of Bayes and Price appeared in 1763, and the question naturally arises 
whether these authors knew of Hume’s problem of induction and were trying in 
their own researches to solve the difficulties to which Hume had drawn attention. 
In the case of Price, this question can definitely be answered in the affirmative. 
There is a great deal of external evidence which links Price to Hume, and the 
internal evidence of Price’s contribution to the joint paper clearly indicates that he 
is attempting to answer Hume, even though Hume is not actually mentioned by 
name [6]. There is no such evidence, however, which links Bayes to Hume. Yet a 
connection between them is by no means unlikely. As Bayes was a friend of Price, 
it seems to me likely that he knew of Hume’s work, at least through Price even if 
in no other way. Bayes’ reluctance to discuss the problem of induction explicitly 
is easily explained by his intellectual caution, which contrasts so strikingly with 
Price’s boldness. It therefore seems to me likely that Hume’s problem of induc- 
tion was part of the problem situation which led Bayes to his mathematical theory. 
Another view of the matter is possible, however [7]. Bayes might have devel- 
oped his mathematical results from a study of Jakob Bernoulli and of De Moivre, 
who may indeed have been his teacher [Barnard 1970, 1311. The link between 
Bayes’ mathematics and Hume’s problem of induction would then have been 
established by Price. A small piece of indirect evidence favors this view. There is 
a passage in David Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His 
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Expectations (London, 1749) which has been taken to refer to Bayes. Hartley has 
been discussing De Moivre’s version of Bernoulli’s theorem and goes on to say: 
An ingenious Friend has communicated to me a Solution of the inverse Problem, in which he 
has shown what the Expectation is, when an Event has happened p times. and failed q times, 
. . [Hartley 1749 1, 3391 
Stigler [1983] has suggested that Hartley’s “ingenious Friend” was not Thomas 
Bayes, but someone else-the real discoverer of Bayes’ theorem. This seems to 
me unlikely, however, since, when Bayes’ paper was published only 14 years 
later, no claims of earlier discovery were made on behalf of anyone else. 
Assuming then that Hartley is referring to Bayes, does this point to a date for 
Bayes’ theorem too early for Hume as an influence on Bayes to have been possi- 
ble? Stigler claims that “Hartley finished his book early. Hartley’s Observations 
on Man was begun by 1730 and his correspondence with Lister shows it to have 
been substantially complete by 1739, and fully finished by 1745” [Stigler 1983, 
2931. But even if this is true in general, the putative reference to Bayes might have 
been added by Hartley at the last minute. Bayes had clearly studied, and was 
influenced by, the problems of Jakob Bernoulli and De Moivre. However, 
Hume’s Enquiry of 1748 might have been the final stimulus for producing his 
theorem, and there would still have been time for him to communicate it to 
Hartley, and to obtain a reference in Observations on Man of 1749. 
It is clear therefore that Hume may have influenced Bayes, but that there is no 
definite evidence that this was really the case. Let us turn therefore to examining 
the links between Hume and Price, where we are on firmer historical ground. 
2. HUME AND PRICE: THE INTRODUCTORY LETTER 
Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding [ 17481 is today read mainly 
for its clear formulation of the problem of induction. However, in Hume’s own 
day, the part which excited the most interest was Section X, “Of Miracles.” This 
was indeed one of Hume’s principal weapons in his attack on religion. Hume 
argued that testimony can never be sufficiently strong to establish that a miracle 
has occurred. It follows from this that the New Testament is not believable as a 
historical document, and the whole basis of Christianity is thereby severely under- 
mined. 
It is not surprising therefore that many attempts were made by defenders of 
Christianity to answer Hume’s arguments. In The Life ofDavid flume, Mossner 
records that “answers to the two Enquiries (including “Of Miracles”) alone to- 
talled two in 1751; four in 1752; five in 1753; three in 1754; and two in 1755” 
[Mossner 1954, 2861. Mossner goes on to say that “ ‘Of Miracles’, perhaps natu- 
rally enough considering the temper of the age, was chiefly responsible for the 
sudden interest taken in Hume” [Mossner 1954, 2861 and that “ ‘Of Miracles’ 
excited keen interest in the 1750s and 1760s” [Mossner 1954, 2941. 
Thus during the 1750s and 1760s any intellectual clergyman might have had an 
interest in answering Hume. However, a Presbyterian clergyman might have had 
still greater interest in doing so. Although Hume attacks all forms of Christianity, 
he is particularly harsh on the Presbyterian church of his own native Scotland, In 
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1754, Hume published the first volume of his history of Great Britain dealing with 
the reigns of James I and Charles I. The historical events which he describes allow 
him many opportunities to be ironical and sarcastic at the expense of the Presbyte- 
rians. Here, for example, is his description of the situation in 1643 when the Scats 
were preparing to intervene on behalf of Parliament against the King: 
Great were the rejoicings among the Scotch. that they should be the happy instruments of 
extending the kingdom of Christ, and dissipating that profound darkness in which their 
neighbouring nations were involved. The general assembly applauded this glorious imitation 
of the piety displayed by their ancestors, who, by three different applications, during the 
reign of Elizabeth, had endeavoured to engage the English, by persuasion, to lay aside the use 
of the surplice, tippet, and comer cap. [Hume 1754, 5501 
We would expect therefore that either or both of our two Presbyterian clergy- 
men, Bayes and Price, would be interested in answering Hume [8]. This expecta- 
tion is directly confirmed in the case of Price. As Mossner has already noted, 
“Richard Price . . . in 1758 had joined the ranks of the writers against Hume with 
his Reuiew of the Principal Questions and DifJiculties in Morals” [Mossner 1954, 
3941. Moreover in 1767 Price published Four Dissertations, the last of which was 
entitled The fmportance of Christianity, the Nature of Historical Evidence, and 
Miracles. In this dissertation Price uses Bayes’ theorem in an attempt to answer 
Hume’s argument about miracles. Part of his reasoning on this subject is, as we 
shall see, already contained in the appendix to the joint paper of 1763. 
Price also met Hume personally just before 1763. This is how Mossner de- 
scribes the meeting: 
Hume made many new friends during his London visits of 17.58-59 and 1761. One 
interesting group consisted of those clerical answerers to his writings who had treated him, as 
befits the philosopher, with courtesy and respect. At Hume’s desire, Drs William Adams, 
John Douglas, and Richard Price were invited to a dinner at Cadell’s house in the Strand. The 
learned clerics, we are assured, “were all delighted with David”, who long remained on good 
terms with them, exchanging visits and letters. [Mossner 1954, 3931 
The introductory letter which Price wrote to the 1763 paper does not mention 
Hume by name. However, the external evidence just presented concerning 
Price’s involvement with Hume in the period 1758-1768 makes it likely that when 
Price speaks of inductive reasoning, recurrency of events, and causes in nature he 
has Hume in mind. This view is strengthened by the internal evidence of the text 
itself, since several passages from Price recall passages in Hume’s Enquiry con- 
cerning Human Understanding [1748]. Thus Price, speaking of the mathematical 
problem which Bayes has solved, says: 
Every judicious person will be sensible that the problem now mentioned is by no means 
merely a curious speculation in the doctrine of chances, but necessary to be solved in order to 
[provide] a sure foundation for all our reasonings concerning past facts, and what is likely to 
be hereafter. Common sense is indeed sufficient to shew us that, from the observation of what 
has in former instances been the consequence of a certain cause or action, one may make a 
judgment what is likely to be the consequence of it another time, and that the larger [the] 
number of experiments we have to support a conclusion, so much the more reason we have to 
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take it for granted. But it is certain that we cannot determine, at least not to any nicety, in 
what degree repeated experiments confirm a conclusion, without the particular discussion of 
the beforementioned problem; which, therefore, is necessary to be considered by anyone who 
would give a clear account of the strength of analogical or inductive reasoning; . . . [Bayes 
& Price 1763, 134-1351 
Compare this with the following passage from Hume’s Enquiry concerning Hu- 
man Understanding: 
And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experi- 
ence, or to reject that great guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to 
have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this 
mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which 
nature has placed among different objects. From causes which appear similar we expect 
similar effects. This is the sum of ail our experimental conclusions. . It is only after a 
long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security 
with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which, from one 
instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances 
that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of 
information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any 
such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction, if anyone will vouchsafe to 
bestow it on me. [Hume 1748, 361 
Price can be seen as responding to this challenge and as attempting to instruct 
Hume in a “process of reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, 
so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances. . . .” This 
“process of reasoning” is none other than Bayesian conditionalization. Price 
certainly thought that Bayesianism provides an answer to Hume’s doubts about 
induction, for he goes on to say in the introductory letter: 
. . . the converse problem solved in this essay . . shews us, with distinctness and preci- 
sion, in every case of any particular order or recurrency of events, what reason there is to 
think that such recurrency or order is derived from stable causes or regulations in nature, 
. . . [Bayes & Price 1763, 1351 
Now, according to Hume, it is not reason but a kind of animal instinct which leads 
us to believe that the recurrency of events is brought about by stable causes. 
Price continues his discussion of inductive reasoning in an appendix to the joint 
paper. To follow what he says there, however, it will first be necessary to consider 
the mathematical results which Bayes establishes in the main body of the paper. 
In doing this, we will, as promised, explain the connection between Bayes’ treat- 
ment and the objections to Bayesianism made, much later, by Fisher and Ney- 
man, These matters will occupy us in the next three sections. 
3. BAYES’ PAPER: THE BILLIARD TABLE EXAMPLE 
Bayes begins in Section I by giving a definition of probability, and then proving 
a number of basic propositions. This treatment of the foundations is by no means 
uninteresting [9], but our purposes will be adequately served by passing on to the 
material in Section II. Here Bayes introduces the consideration of a square table 
or plane ABCD, on which balls 0 or W are thrown. For obvious reasons, we shall 
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refer to this as Bayes’ billiard table example, although, strictly speaking, Bayes 
does not mention billiards. Bayes draws a diagram and treats the integral calculus 
questions which are involved geometrically. It will be easier, however, to re- 
describe the example in modern terms and to present paraphrases of the proposi- 
tions which Bayes proves about the billiard table. 
Let us assume that a side of the square table is of unit length. Let us take one of 
the sides as the x-axis. Bayes supposes that the ball W is first thrown, and stops at 
a point with x-coordinate p say. The ball 0 is then thrown n times, and, if the X- 
coordinate of the point where it stops is less than or equal to p on a particular 
throw, the event M is said to have happened on that trial. Suppose further that 0 I 
a 5 b I 1 we can then paraphrase Bayes’ Propositions 8 and 9 as follows. 
PROPOSITION 8. Before the ball W is thrown, the probability that p shall fall 
between a and b and that the event M should happen r times andfail n - r times in 
n trials is 
I 
h 
“C,Y( 1 - x)“-’ dx. 
u 
PROPOSITION 9. Zf before anything is discovered concerning the value of p, it 
should appear that the event M has happened r times and failed n - r times in n 
trials, and from hence I guess that p lies between a and b, the probability that Z 
am right is 
I 
h 
xr( 1 - x)“-’ dx ll 
I ; ~‘(1 - x)“-’ dx 
(1) 
Equation (1) is sometimes referred to as Bayes’ Theorem. 
A particular special case, considered by Price in his appendix, occurs when the 
event has always happened, i.e., r = n. The integrals can then easily be evaluated, 
and we get 
(2) 
I shall call (2) “Price’s rule of succession.” 
Some confusion has arisen because, when Laplace treated the question later in 
1774, he proved a slightly different, but related, result. Laplace showed that if the 
event M has occurred r times, the probability that it will occur at the next trial is 
I ’ ~‘~‘(1 - x)“-’ dx 0
(3) 
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Again taking the special case when the event has always happened, we obtain 
(4) 
I shall call (4) “Laplace’s rule of succession.” 
The confusion arises because of the differences between (1) and (3), and be- 
tween (2) and (4). It might seem as if Bayes and Price have made a mistake which 
Laplace later corrected. Indeed Karl Pearson f 1921-19331 cites a case where 
Laplace’s formula (3) should be preferred to Bayes’ formula (I), and concludes: 
“There is great obscurity about the whole matter, but if my view be correct Bayes 
had certainly not reached ‘Bayes’ Theorem’ ” [Pearson 1921-1933, 3681. We see 
from this that Pearson identifies Bayes’ theorem with Laplace’s (3) rather than 
Bayes’ own (1). Pearson also goes on to say that this matter is not at all clearly 
indicated in Todhunter. It seems to me, however, that Todhunter does explain the 
matter correctly in his chapter on Bayes [Todhunter 1865, 294-3001. Todhunter’s 
view is that Bayes, Price, and Laplace are all correct, but are proving different 
things. All three are dealing with independent trials n in which a particular event 
M has a constant, but unknown, probability p of occurring. The evidence assumed 
(e say) is that on n trials, M has occurred r times. Bayes now calculated 
Prob (The unknown probability p lies between a and ble). 
This probability is correctly evaluated by Bayes in his formula (1). Price’s rule of 
succession is a special case of this with r = n. Laplace, however, considers 
Prob (Event M will occur on next trialle). 
This probability is given correctly by his formula (3). Laplace’s rule of succession 
is a special case of this with r = n. 
In the appendix to the paper, Price discusses the general problem of inductive 
inference, using his rule of succession. The discussion would have been simpler if 
he had used Laplace’s rule of succession, as was done in later treatments of the 
question. However, Price’s rule of succession is not mathematically incorrect, 
and the general logic of the argument is the same whichever mathematical formu- 
lation is employed [ 101. 
We have reached the point in Bayes’ paper where he introduces a scholium 
generalizing his results from the special case of the billiard table. This then is the 
moment of transition from the generally accepted Bayes’ theorem to the problem- 
atic and controversial doctrine of Bayesianism. But what exactly are these addi- 
tional and questionable assumptions which Bayesianism involves? I think we can 
bring these assumptions most clearly into the light by considering the objections 
which have been made to Bayesianism, and, in particular, the objections of Fisher 
and Neyman. We shall therefore consider the statements of Fisher and Neyman 
on this subject before turning to Bayes and his scholium. 
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4. FISHER’S AND NEYMAN’S OBJECTIONS TO BAYESIANISM 
In order to formulate these objections, let us forget about the billiard table and 
formulate Bayes’ problem in more general terms. Suppose we have a sequence of 
possible trials, on each of which an event M may or may not occur. We assume 
as background to the problem that the trials are independent and M has a constant 
(but unknown) probability p of occurring on each trial. Assume further that there 
are n trials and M occurs Y times. Our problem is to draw inferences from this 
evidence regarding the value of the unknown probability p. If we accept Bayes- 
ianism, we can conclude that the probability that the unknown probability p lies 
between a and b is given, in the circumstances specified, by Bayes’ formula (1). 
If we look at the derivation of Bayes’ formula (l), we will see that, in the general 
case, it involves the assumption that we know a priori that p is uniformly distrib- 
uted in the interval [0, 11. This assumption is usually justified by an appeal to the 
so-called principle of indifference. We have no reason to suppose that p is in one 
part of the interval rather than another, and we should therefore assign a uniform 
distribution to p. 
Fisher, however, denies that we can have a priori knowledge, based on the 
principle of indifference, that p has a uniform distribution. His argument is as 
follows (see [Fisher 1956, 16-171). Define + by 
p = sin2$, where 0 % 4 5 nl2. 
We have no reason to suppose that 4 is in one part of the interval rather than 
another. Thus, if the above argument based on the principle of indifference were 
correct, we could equally well conclude that 6 had a uniform a priori distribution 
in [0, 7r/2]. But this would give to p a nonuniform a priori distribution in [0, 11. 
Fisher, therefore, thinks that we cannot, in general, assign a priori distributions to 
parameters and that Bayesianism fails, for this reason, to give a satisfactory 
account of statistical inference. Of course the point stressed here by Fisher is 
really a traditional one. It goes back to the so-called paradoxes of geometrical 
probability, and the whole matter is well discussed in Keynes’ Treatise on Proba- 
bility [1921, 41-461. 
The next argument against Bayesianism was, to the best of my knowledge, 
genuinely invented by Neyman, and appeared first in his [ 19371. Fisher questioned 
whether we could know what a priori distribution a parameter had. Neyman went 
further and questioned whether it was admissible to ascribe an a priori distribution 
to a parameter at all. 
To see the force of his argument, let us begin by observing that probability 
distributions can only be correctly ascribed to random variables. Now what can 
we regard as a random variable? The answer depends upon what interpretation of 
probability we adopt. Let us begin by taking the scientific view that probabilities 
are objective features of the physical world like charges or masses. On this ap- 
proach, we need to have a set of repeatable conditions, say Y. If any possible 
result of these conditions is given by a real number, we can say that the results are 
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specified by a random variable X. The range of X is the set of possible results of Y, 
and the probability distribution of X gives the weight we attach to different possi- 
ble results of Y. Probability distributions are related to the objective variation in 
the value of X obtained when Y is repeated. 
Now can a parameter, such as p in the present example, be regarded as the 
result of repeating an underlying set of conditions? Sometimes perhaps it can, but, 
normally, the answer will be “no.” In general a parameter such as p will not give 
the result of repeating any set of conditions. It will not be a quantity which 
fluctuates objectively on repeating some experiment. It will instead (if the back- 
ground assumptions are correct) be a fixed, though unknown, constant. Thus, 
given a scientific interpretation of probability, we cannot regard a parameter as a 
random variable and so cannot ascribe an a priori distribution to it as the Bayesian 
method requires. This is Neyman’s new argument against Bayesianism. 
For the sake of precision, we must make one small qualification to the above 
formulation of Neyman’s argument. An unknown constant can, in fact, even given 
a scientific interpretation of probability, be regarded as a random variable in a 
“trivial” or “degenerate” sense. Suppose p has the value a, where a is a real 
constant. We can then say that p is a random variable with the distribution 
prob (p = a) = 1 
prob (p # a) = 0. 
In his [1937] paper already cited, Neyman rules out such degenerate random 
variables by requiring that the range of any random variable should contain two 
subsets A and B such that 
AnB=0, prob (A) # 0, prob (B) # 0. (5) 
However, it seems to me mathematically convenient to be able to treat a constant 
as a random variable by the above method. Let us therefore allow such random 
variables but say that a random variable is trivial or degenerate unless Neyman’s 
condition (5) is satisfied. We can then put Neyman’s point by saying that parame- 
ters will in general be unknown constants and hence only random variables in a 
degenerate sense. They will not be random variables in the nontrivial sense which 
is required by Bayesian inference. 
Neyman’s argument depends on the adoption of a strictly scientific interpreta- 
tion of probability. If we allow an epistemological interpretation of probability as 
say degree of belief, or degree of rational belief, there is nothing to prevent us 
from regarding an unknown constant, a say, as a random variable. On this view, a 
does not have to express the outcome of a set of conditions whose repetition 
produces objective random variation. It suffices that some particular individual 
has beliefs, whether rational or not, about the possible values of a. 
Thus Neyman’s argument requires stronger premises than Fishers. It would be 
possible to accept the analysis of probability as degree of rational belief and yet 
agree with Fisher that it is impossible in many cases to obtain a priori probability 
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distributions for unknown parameters. Neyman’s argument may depend on 
stronger premises than Fisher’s, but it also rules out more. In particular, Ney- 
man’s argument would not allow us, in most cases, to assign any probability 
distribution, whether a priori or a posreriori, to an unknown parameter. Thus, in 
particular, the argument rules out Fisher’s fiducial approach which I described in 
the Introduction as an inductivist, but non-Bayesian, approach to statistics. 
Fisher thought that we could not, in general, obtain a priori probability distribu- 
tions for unknown parameters. However, he hoped to use his fiducial argument to 
get a posteriori distributions for such parameters-at least in some cases. But if 
we accept Neyman’s argument, such a posteriori distributions are just as illegiti- 
mate as the a priori ones. 
We can express the objections of Fisher and Neyman as conditions under which 
they would accept Bayes’ formula (1) as valid. More specifically we have: 
(i) The Neyman Condition: The parameter p must be the result of a set of 
underlying conditions Y, whose repetition produces objective random variation. 
(ii) The Fisher Condition: It must be a piece of genuine knowledge, not based on 
the spurious principle of indifference, that p has a uniform distribution. 
Now the interesting thing is that Bayes’ billiard table example does indeed satisfy 
these two conditions. It therefore seems to me likely that Bayes had some inkling 
of the objections we have been discussing in this section and constructed his 
example deliberately in order to avoid them. I am not of course saying that Bayes 
had grasped the objections in the full clarity and explicitness with which they are 
formulated by Fisher and Neyman. My claim is rather that he had some, at least 
partial, awareness that his approach was liable to objections of this sort. A further 
analysis of the joint paper of 1763, to which we now return, will, I hope, make this 
claim plausible. 
5. BAYES’ PAPER: THE SCHOLIUM 
Price gives us some information on this point in his introductory letter, where 
he writes: 
But he [Bayes] afterwards considered, that the postulate on which he had argued might not 
perhaps be looked upon by all as reasonable; and therefore he chose to lay down in another 
form the proposition in which he thought the solution of the problem is contained, and in a 
scholium to subjoin the reasons why he thought so, rather than to take into his mathematical 
reasoning anything that might admit dispute. This, you will observe, is the method which he 
has pursued in this essay. [Bayes & Price 1763, 1341 
It is clear from this that Bayes thought that some points in the full Bayesian 
position might be disputed. He therefore devised the billiard table example in 
order to obtain mathematical results which would be generally accepted as correct 
and then put the more doubtful assumptions in his scholium. Of course we shall 
never know what objections Bayes thought might be made to his original postu- 
late. However, it is significant that the billiard table example satisfies both the 
Neyman and the Fisher conditions. 
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In the billiard table example, the unknown parameter is the probability p say 
that the event M occurs. The ball W is thrown onto the table, and p is the X- 
coordinate of the point at which it stops. So p is in fact the result of a set of 
conditions Y, whose repetition produces objective random variation. Clearly the 
set Y could be repeated many times. The results of these repetitions would vary 
randomly, and sop can, in this case, be considered a random variable in the fully 
objective and scientific sense. Thus the Neyman condition is satisfied. 
But how do we know that p has a uniform distribution in [0, l]? This actually 
follows from the way the experimental conditions Y are set up. As Bayes says: 
I suppose the square table or plane ABCD to be so made and levelled, that if either of the balls 
0 or W be thrown upon it, there shall be the same probability that it rests upon any one equal 
part of the plane as another, and that it must necessarily rest somewhere upon it. [Bayes & 
Price 1763, 1401 
So Bayes does not derive the uniform distribution of p from any kind of principle 
of indifference. He obtains it rather from the conditions of the experiment-from 
the way in which the table is made and leveled and the manner in which the balls 
are thrown upon it. 
No one who has understood Bayes’ problem can fail to appreciate the intellec- 
tual subtlety of his billiard table example. Bayes wanted to derive his formula (1) 
in a way that would be looked upon by all as reasonable. His billiard table pro- 
vides a simple and elegant case where this can indeed be done. Since both the 
Neyman and the Fisher conditions are satisfied in the case of Bayes’ billiard table, 
the derivation of Bayes’ formula (1) is quite unproblematic in this example and 
could be accepted by Bayesian and non-Bayesian alike. If Bayes had ended his 
paper after Proposition 9, he would correctly be known as the man who proved 
Bayes’ formula, but not as the founder of Bayesianism. However, the historical 
Bayes pressed on, and introduced, in the scholium, the controversial assumptions 
which constitute Bayesianism [ 1 I]. 
This is what Bayes says in the scholium: 
In what follows therefore I shall take for granted that the rule given concerning the event M in 
Prop. 9 is also the rule to be used in relation to any event concerning the probability of which 
nothing at all is known antecedently to any trials made or observed concerning it. And such 
an event I shall call an unknown event. [Bayes & Price 1736, 1441 
What Bayes is saying, in effect, is that any unknown probability can be treated 
as if it were a random variable with a uniform distribution in [O, I]. Thus Bayes 
was indeed a Bayesian, but the way in which he introduces the crucial Bayesian 
assumption shows that he was a cautious and doubtful Bayesian. 
It might be expected that Bayes would argue for the controversial Bayesian 
assumption by applying the principle of indifference directly top in order to argue 
that p has a uniform distribution in [0, 11. This was the way in which Laplace and 
many later Bayesians proceeded, and it was criticized, as we have seen, by R. A. 
Fisher. Bayes, however, with characteristic ingenuity does not follow this familiar 
path, but provides another quite different argument for the Bayesian assumption 
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of the scholium. This argument has been well analyzed in [Edwards 19781 and 
[Stigler 19821, and we will give a brief account of their conclusions here. 
Let us return first to the billiard table example, and consider the probability that 
the event M occurs exactly r times in n trials. This probability can be obtained by 
setting a = 0 and b = 1 in the integral in Proposition 8. Evaluating the integral in 
standard fashion we obtain 
Prob (M occurs exactly r times in n trials) = $ (6) 
Now let us pass to the case of an unknown event, and suppose we are going to 
perform IZ trials concerning it. Bayes argues that there is no reason to suppose that 
in these trials the event will occur a certain number of times, r say, rather than 
another, s say, where r # s and 1 5 r, s 9 n. We should therefore assign equal 
probabilities to each of these possible outcomes, and so we obtain 
Prob (Unknown event occurs exactly r times in IZ trials) = & (7) 
But, since the probabilities in (6) and (7) are the same, we can treat our unknown 
event as if it were an event of type M, and hence apply Proposition 9. This is how 
Bayes himself puts the argument: 
And that the same rule is the proper one to be used in the case of an event concerning the 
probability of which we absolutely know nothing antecedently to any trials made concerning 
it, seems to appear from the following consideration; viz. that concerning such an event I 
have no reason to think that, in a certain number of trials, it should rather happen any one 
possible number of times than another. For, on this account, I may justly reason concerning it 
as if its probability had been at first unfixed, and then determined in such a manner as to give 
me no reason to think that, in a certain number of trials, it should rather happen any one 
possible number of times than another, But this is exactly the case of the event M. [Bayes & 
Price 1763, 1431 
Note that Bayes states his argument with characteristic caution, writing that the 
desired result only “seems to appear from the following consideration.” The 
argument proceeds by applying the principle of indifference to the number of 
successes (occurrences of the event). Edwards objects that we could apply the 
principle of indifference instead to the possible sequences of successes and fail- 
ures, and would in that case obtain a different result. As he puts it: 
Had Bayes considered instead that in a situation of complete ignorance each possible se- 
quence of successes and failures was equally probable, he would have arrived at the prior 
distribution giving probability one to p = 1. [Edwards 1978, 1181 
Stigler defends Bayes against this criticism of Edwards. He argues that r/n esti- 
mates the unknown p, and so to have one value of r/n more likely than another is 
to contradict the hypothesis that we are absolutely ignorant about p [Stigler 1982, 
2561. Stigler does, however, point out another difficulty in Bayes’ argument. Even 
if we accept (7), i.e., prob (r/n) = ll(n + l), it is not clear that it follows mathemati- 
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tally that the unknown parameter p has a uniform distribution in [0, I]. Knowl- 
edge of (7) is equivalent to knowledge of the first n moments of the prior distribu- 
tion of p, but the first n moments do not determine the prior distribution [Stigler 
1982, 2531. 
It is clear that Bayes’ argument on this point is not entirely convincing to 
modern experts. This need hardly surprise us, however, since the crucial Bayes- 
ian assumption of the scholium is at the center of the 20th-century controversies 
concerning Bayesianism. What is significant, however, is that Bayes does not 
simply apply the principle of indifference to the unknown parameter, but intro- 
duces an argument of greater subtlety and complexity. 
Let us now turn from Bayes to Price, and see how Price attempts to use Bayes’ 
mathematical results to resolve Hume’s doubts about inductive reasoning, and 
about miracles. 
6. HUME AND PRICE: THE APPENDIX 
Price bases his general discussion of inductive reasoning on what I have called 
his rule of succession. Suppose an event M has an unknown probability p of 
occurring on a particular trial. Suppose further that M occurs 12 times in IZ trials. 
Then Price’s rule of succession states that the probability of p lying between a and 
b on this given evidence is b”+’ - an+’ . Price considers the particular case of the 
probability of p being more than 1, i.e., b = 1 and a = 1. For n = 1, the probability 
is 1 - ($)2 = 2, or odds of 3 to 1. For arbitrary IZ, the probability is 1 - @)“+I, or 
odds of 2”+i - 1 to 1. In the spirit of Bayes’ scholium, Price applies these results 
to an arbitrary unknown event: 
Let us then first suppose, of such an event as that called M in the essay, or an event about the 
probability of which, antecedently to trials, we know nothing, that it has happened once, and 
that it is enquired what conclusion we may draw from hence with respect to the probability of 
its happening on a second trial. 
The answer is that there would be an odds of three to one for somewhat more than an even 
chance that it would happen on a second trial . . . it will be 1 - (f)Z or 2; which shews the 
chance there is that the probability of an event that has happened once lies somewhere 
between 1 and 4, or (which is the same) the odds that it is somewhat more than an even chance 
that it will happen on a second trial. 
In the same manner it will appear that . . . if the event has happened n times [ 121, there be 
an odds of 2”+’ - 1 to one, for more than an equal chance that it will happen on further trials. 
[Bayes & Price 1763, 1491 
Price then goes on to argue that these calculations are “all strictly applicable to 
the events and appearances of nature” [Bayes & Price 1763, 1501. Significantly 
Price gives examples which are to be found in Hume. Thus he mentions the 
burning of wood, which appears in Hume’s Enquiry [1748,44], and the falling of a 
stone, which is in Hume’s Enquiry [174g, 251. The full paragraph from Price runs 
as follows: 
1 have made these observations chiefly because they are all strictly applicable to the events 
and appearances of nature. Antecedently to all experience, it would be improbable as infinite 
to one, that any particular event, beforehand imagined, should follow the application of any 
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one natural object to another; because there would be an equal chance for any one of an 
infinity of events. [Note that so far Price is in agreement with Hume.] But if we had once seen 
any particular effects, as the burning of wood on putting it into fire, or the falling of a stone on 
detaching it from all contiguous objects, then the conclusions to be drawn from any number of 
subsequent events of the same kind would be to be determined in the same manner with the 
conclusions just mentioned relating to the constitution of the solid I have supposed. In other 
words, the first experiment supposed to be ever made on any natural object would only 
inform US of one event that may follow a particular change in the circumstances of those 
objects; but it would not suggest to us any ideas of uniformity in nature, or give us the least 
reason to apprehend that it was, in that instance or in any other, regular rather than irregular 
in its operations. But if the same event has followed without interruption in any one or more 
subsequent experiments, then some degree of uniformity will be observed; YCYISCM will be 
given to expect the same success in further experiments, and the calculations directed by the 
solution of this problem may be made. [Bayes & Price 1763, 150; my italics] 
The passage in italics contains the essential difference between Hume and 
Price. Hume writes: 
When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, 
that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the cause to the 
effect proceeds not from reason. [Hume 1748, 54; my italics] 
The transition “proceeds not from reason” according to Hume, but it is based on 
reason according to Price. The reason in question, Price thinks, is a mathematical 
calculation using Bayes’ formula which enables us to show that there is a high 
probability of future success, given that the same event has followed without 
interruption in numerous past experiments. Price next gives an example which 
establishes further links with Hume. Hume speaks of: “Adam, though his rational 
faculties be supposed at the very first, entirely perfect, . . .” [Hume 1748, 271; 
while Price considers: “a person just brought forth into this world . . ,” [Bayes & 
Price 1763, 1501. Price’s Adam proceeds to calculate, on the basis of his experi- 
ence, the probability of the sun’s rising tomorrow. Hume mentions the question of 
whether the sun will rise tomorrow [1748, 211. This is what Price has to say: 
Let us imagine to ourselves the case of a person just brought forth into this world, and left to 
collect from his observation of the order and course of events what powers and causes take 
place in it. The sun would, probably, be the first object that would engage his attention; but 
after losing it the first night he would be entirely ignorant whether he should ever see it again. 
He would therefore be in the condition of a person making a first experiment about an event 
entirely unknown to him. But let him see a second appearance or one return of the sun, and an 
expectation would be raised in him of a second return, and he might know that there was an 
odds of 3 to 1 for some probability of this. This odds would increase, as before represented, 
with the number of returns to which he was witness. But no finite number of returns would be 
sufficient to produce absolute or physical certainty. [Bayes & Price 1763, 150-1511 
Price believes that these considerations do provide an adequate answer to Hume’s 
doubts about induction. For he writes: 
With respect, therefore, particularly to the course of events in nature, it appears, that there is 
demonstrative evidence to prove that they are derived from permanent causes, or laws 
originally established in the constitution of nature in order to produce that order of events 
which we observe, . . . [Bayes & Price 1763, 1521 
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But how successful really is Price’s Bayesian solution to the problem of induc- 
tion? When speaking of his “person just brought forth into this world,” Price 
would have done well to add Hume’s condition that “his rational faculties be 
supposed at the very first entirely perfect, . . . .” Price’s Adam, after seeing the 
sun rise only once, “might know that there was an odds of 3 to 1 for some 
probability of” its rising a second time. This is to suppose that Price’s Adam 
might, on the second day of his life, have performed all the calculations in the joint 
paper of 1763. This is hardly plausible. 
A more defensible position might be the following. Price’s Adam initially makes 
his inductive inferences using a Humean kind of innate animal instinct. Later 
however he learns Bayes’ theorems and uses them to provide a rational justifica- 
tion for his inductive instinct. But how rational would such a Bayesian justifica- 
tion really be? It involves assuming that the Neyman and the Fisher conditions are 
satisfied, and this is a very questionable assumption in most cases. It also involves 
a yet more fundamental assumption which I shall call the Bernoulli condition. 
The entire mathematical reasoning of Bayes and Price is based on assuming the 
model of a sequence of independent trials on which an event M has a constant, but 
unknown, probability p of occurring. Probabilists sometimes call this the assump- 
tion of Bernoulli trials. Now very often a sequence of events can be considered as 
a sequence of outcomes of Bernoulli trials, but this is by no means always the 
case. Situations can occur in which the probability of a given event varies from 
trial to trial, or again the independence assumption may break down, and we may 
be dealing with a Markov Chain or some other case of dependence. We cannot 
therefore assume a priori that the Bernoulli condition holds, but this is just what 
we do have to assume for Price’s Bayesian approach to induction to work. 
Although we cannot assume a priori that the Bernoulli condition holds, we can 
always guess or conjecture that it does. But such a conjecture then needs to be 
tested-perhaps by a series of statistical tests. If this were done, however, we 
would be applying the Popperian method of conjectures and refutations and would 
have moved away from the Bayesian approach. 
For this reason I do not think that Price succeeds in resolving Hume’s problems 
about induction. However, he does deserve great credit for being the first to 
attempt a general Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. 
In the introductory section on the problem of induction of his [ 1934, 27-301, 
Popper mentions as existing approaches to the problem, the Kantian doctrine of 
the synthetic a priori, and (in the passage already quoted) the attempt to create a 
probabilistic inductive logic (Bayesianism). If the link between Hume and Price is 
accepted, then we can say that both these approaches originally appeared as 
direct responses to Hume’s Enquiry of 1748. 
The case of Kant is well known. It was the study of Hume around 1772 that, on 
Kant’s own account, interrupted his dogmatic slumber and gave a completely 
different direction to his enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy. After 
many years of meditation, Kant published his attempted solution of Hume’s prob- 
lem (the doctrine of the synthetic a priori) in the first edition of the Critique of 
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Pure Reason (1781). If the argument of this paper is correct, then another major 
approach to Hume’s problem was developed by Price and Bayes, again as a direct 
response to Hume’s Enquiry, and was published in 1763. 
I conclude this paper by explaining briefly how Price, in his dissertation of 1768, 
attempted to use Bayesianism to answer Hume’s argument about miracles. 
Hume’s original account of the matter is in Chapter 10 of his Enquiry [1748, 109- 
1311. There is a good discussion of the argument, from a modem point of view, in 
Swinburne [ 19701. 
The nerve of Hume’s argument is contained in the following passage: 
. . no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, 
that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact. which it endeavours to establish; 
. . . [Hume 1748, 1 IS-1 161 
Hume has already argued that a miracle is by definition a violation of a law of 
nature, and a law of nature is something for which there is very strong empirical 
evidence. As Hume puts it himself: 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has 
established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as 
entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. [Hume 1748, 1141 
A miracle can thus be established only if there is very strong evidence, provided 
by testimony, in its favor. Yet it is not miraculous, or even unusual, for witnesses 
to lie. Besides mankind has a strong propensity to the marvelous, and there are 
many examples of faked miracles. As Hume says: 
The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all 
ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their 
absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the 
marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. 
[Hume 1748, 1181 
What did Price have to say against this? He used his Bayesianism to argue that 
evidence never establishes a law of nature with certainty, but only with some 
probability less than one. This point was already made in the joint paper where he 
said: “But no finite number of returns would be sufficient to produce absolute or 
physical certainty” [Bayes & Price 1763, 1511. Price repeated the point in his 
dissertation of 1767 and added the following footnote referring back to his earlier 
work with Bayes: 
In an essay published in vol. 53d of the Philosophical Transactions, what is said here is 
proved by mathematical demonstration, and a method shewn of determining the exact proba- 
bility of all conclusions founded on induction. [Price 1767, 3961 
But if a law of nature can never be established with certainty, this opens up the 
possibility that the evidence of testimony for the miracle will outweigh the evi- 
dence for the law of nature. Moreover Price adduced a number of considerations 
which should, so he thought, lead us to place more trust in human testimony. 
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One action, or one conversation with a man, may convince us of his integrity and induce us to 
believe his testimony, though we had never, in a single instance, experienced his veracity. 
His manner of telling his story, its being corroborated by other testimony, and various 
particulars in the nature and circumstances of it, may satisfy us that it must be true. We feel in 
ourselves, that a regard to truth is one principle in human nature; and we know, that there 
must be such a principle in every reasonable being, and that there is a necessary repugnancy 
between the perception of moral distinctions and deliberate falsehood. To this, chiefly, is 
owing the credit we give to human testimony. [Price 1767, 399-4001 
Price does not seem to me on very strong ground here. It is true that “a regard to 
truth is one principle in human nature.” No doubt most people tell the truth most 
of the time. Yet experience shows that notorious liars exist, and that even the 
most honest tell an occasional falsehood. As for one action or one conversation 
convincing us of someone’s integrity, it is precisely the method of con-men and 
tricksters to assume an air of great sincerity when they set out to dupe their 
victims. The human ability to act is most clearly demonstrated by the frequent 
success which such gentlemen have in their trickery and deceit. 
Price does, however, have another ingenious argument designed to show that 
even very slight human testimony is sometimes taken as establishing an event of 
very low probability. Consider a lottery in which a six-figure number is drawn at 
random. The probability that any particular number will be chosen is vanishingly 
small (10m6). Yet when the winning number is given in the evening paper, we 
usually believe the report without checking the matter further. Price gave the 
example as follows: 
The improbability of drawing a lottery in any particular assigned manner, independently of 
the evidence of testimony, or of our own senses, acquainting us that it has been drawn in that 
manner is such as exceeds all conception. And yet the testimony of a newspaper, or of any 
common man, is sufficient to put us out of doubt about it. [Price 1767, 410-4111 
The lottery case is not really analogous to that of miracles. In a lottery, a 
particular event (the drawing of a particular number) is indeed very improbable, 
but the occurrence of an event of that type (the drawing of some six-figure num- 
ber) is not only not improbable, but even virtually certain. In the case of a miracle, 
however, not only is the particular event (a particular man’s levitating at a particu- 
lar time and place) improbable, but so also is any event of that type (any man’s 
levitating at any time and place). Nonetheless Price’s example is an interesting 
one and shows that the rules for evaluating the probabilities of events on the basis 
of testimony could do with further investigation. 
NOTES 
1. A first draft of this paper was read at a conference on “Science and Imagination in 18th Century 
British Culture” at Gargnano de1 Garda, Italy, on 14 April 1985, and I received a number of helpful 
comments on that occasion-particularly from .I. Brooke. I received further useful comments and 
criticisms of a later typescript from a number of workers in the field including L. J. Cohen, L. J. 
Daston, I. J. Good, I. Hacking, M. B. Hesse, C. Howson, F. Lad, D. V. Lindley, K. C. Ryan, R. 
Swinbume, and two anonymous referees of Historia Mathematics. I am most grateful for this help. 
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2. The Popper-Miller argument has already generated considerable discussion. References to the 
literature to date, together with a defense of one version of the argument, are to be found in [Gillies 
19861. 
3. This point was made to me in conversation with Cohn Howson. Howson, himself, is of course a 
Bayesian and against falsificationism (see his [1984], and [Howson & Franklin 19851). 
4. It should be added, however, that not all statisticians who use Fisher’s statistical tests would 
justify them in terms of a falsificationist methodology. Other justifications in terms of Bayesianism or 
decision theory have been given. For an interesting historical account of the development of the 
fiducial argument, and the paradoxes to which it led, see [Ryan 19801. 
5. L. J. Cohen pointed out to me that the Treatise may have attracted more attention than Hume 
thought. 
6. Hacking says: “The inductive reasoning that Price had in mind was intended as a deliberate and 
conscious response to Hume” [Hacking 1975, 761. In what follows, I shall put forward historical 
evidence supporting this claim. 
7. This was suggested to me in a letter by L. J. Daston, who pointed out the importance, in this 
connection, of the Hartley reference. 
8. It has been pointed out to me that English Presbyterianism of the 18th century may not have been 
quite the same as the Scottish Presbyterianism which Hume attacked. D. 0. Thomas has been kind 
enough to explain the complex situation to me. Bayes and Price were certainly both called Presbyteri- 
ans. Bayes was Minister to the Presbyterian chapel at Little Mount Sion in Tunbridge Wells [Thomas 
1977, 1281. On the other hand, the Presbyterian churches in England seem to have enjoyed greater 
independence and local autonomy than those in Scotland; while theologically Price was anti-Calvinist. 
But, despite these differences, Bayes and Price would, I feel sure, have had sufficient fellow-feeling 
with their brethren north of the border to wish to defend them against Hume’s attack. 
9. For useful discussions of this part of the paper, see [DuPont 1979, 105-123; Hacking 1965, l9l- 
195; Shafer 1982, lO75-10891. 
10. The difference between Bayes and Price on the one hand, and Laplace on the other, is discussed 
in [Dale 1982, 36-381. Dale’s conclusions are in substantial agreement with my own except that he 
thinks that the confusion between formula (I) (Bayes) and formula (3) (Laplace) originated with Price, 
for he writes: “I must confess to agreeing with these authors (that the confusion was caused by PRICE 
and not BAYES) .” [Dale 1982,371. I cannot, however, see any evidence of confusion on this point 
in Price’s writings. 
1 I. DuPont lays great stress on what he calls the “saut conceptuel” (conceptual leap) from the 
billiard table example to the scholium [DuPont 1979, 1251. He also chides Todhunter, rightly in my 
view, for ignoring “ce remarquable saut conceptuel” [DuPont 1979, 1351. 
12. I have here altered Price’s notation to agree with mine. 
REFERENCES 
Barnard, G. A. 1970. Thomas Bayes-A biographical note. In Studies in the history of statistics and 
probability, E. S. Pearson & M. G. Kendall, Eds., pp. 131-133. London: Griffin. 
Bayes, T., & Price, R. 1763. An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Reprinted 
in Studies in the history of statistics and probability, E. S. Pearson & M. Cl. Kendall, Eds., pp. 
134-153. London: Griffin, 1970. 
Camap, R. 1950. Logical foundations of probability, 2nd ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962. 
Dale, A. I. 1982. Bayes or Laplace? An examination of the origin and early applications of Bayes’ 
Theorem. Archive for History of Exact Sciences 27, 23-47. 
De Finetti, B. 1970. Teoria delle probabilitci. Torino: Emaudi. [All English translations from this work 
are my own.] 
HM 14 WAS BAYES A BAYESIAN? 345 
DuPont, P. 1979. Un joyau dans l’histoire des sciences: Le memoire de Thomas Bayes de 1763. 
Rendiconti de1 Seminario Matematico dell’Universita Politecnica di Torino 37(3), 105-138. 
Edwards, A. W. F. 1978. Commentary on the arguments of Thomas Bayes. Scandinavian Journal of 
Statistics 5, 116-118. 
Fisher, R. A. 1930. Inverse probability. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 26,528- 
535. 
- 1956. Statistical methods and scientt$c inference, 2nd ed. Edinburgh/London: Oliver & Boyd, 
1959. 
Gillies, D. A. 1972. The subjective theory of probability. British Journalfor the Philosophy ofScience 
23, 138-157. 
- 1986. In defense of the Popper-Miller argument. Philosophy of Science 53, 110-113. 
Hacking, I. 1965. Logic ofstatistical inference. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
- 1975. The emergence ofprobability, paperback ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984. 
Hartley, D. 1749. Observations on man, his frame, his duty, and his expectations. London: Richard- 
son. 
Hesse, M. 1974. The structure ofscientijc inference. London: Macmillan & Co. 
Howson, C. 1984. Popper’s solution to the problem of induction. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 143-147. 
Howson,.C., & Franklin, A. 1985. A Bayesian analysis of excess content and the localisation of 
support. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36, 425-43 1. 
Hume, D. 1739-1740. A treatise of human nature. London: Everyman, 1961. 
- 1748. An enquiry concerning human understanding, Selby-Bigge ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1963. 
- 1754. The history of Great Britain, Vol. 1, The reigns of James I and Charles I. London: 
Penguin, 1970. 
- 1776. My own life. Reprinted as Appendix A, pp. 61 l-616, to [Mossner 19541. 
Jeffreys, H. 1939. Theory of probability, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961. 
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan & Co., 1963. 
Mossner, E. C. 1954. The life of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 
Neyman, J. 1935. On the problem of confidence intervals. In A selection of early statistical papers 
of J. Neyman, pp. 142-146. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967. 
- 1937. Outline of a theory of statistical estimation based on the classical theory of probability. In 
A seiection of early statistical papers of J. Neyman, pp. 250-290. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1967. 
- 1952. Lectures and conferences on mathematical statistics and probability, 2nd ed. Washing- 
ton: Graduate School U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Pearson, K. 1921-1933. The history of statistics in the 17th and 18th centuries against the changing 
background of intellectual, scientific and religious thought: Lectures by Karl Pearson given at 
University College London during the academic sessions 1921-1933, E. S. Pearson, Ed. London: 
Griffin, 1978. 
Popper, K. R. 1934. The logic of scientific discovery, 8th ed. London: Hutchinson, 1975. 
Popper, K. R., & Miller, D. 1983. A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability. Nature 
(London) 302,687-688. 
Price, R. 1767. Four dissertations. London: Millar & Cadell. 
Ryan, K. C. 1980. Historical development of R. A. Fisher’s jducial argument. London University 
Ph.D. thesis. Unpublished. 
346 DONALD A. GILLIES HM 14 
Shafer, G. 1982. Bayes’ two arguments for the rule of conditioning. Anna/s of Statistics lO(4). 1075- 
1089. 
Stigler, S. M. 1982. Thomas Bayes’s Bayesian inference. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A 
145(2), 250-258. 
- 1983. Who discovered Bayes’ Theorem? American Statistician 37, 290-296. 
Swinbume, R. 1970. The concept of miracle. London: Macmillan & Co. 
Thomas, D. 0. 1977. The honest mind: The thought and work of Richard Price. Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press. 
Todhunter, I. 1865. A history of the mathematical theory ofprobability from the time of Pascal to that 
of Lap/ace. New York: Chelsea, 1965. 
